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Rubin v. Islamic Republic  
of Iran, 1997-2015
BY GABRIELLE GOODWIN1
Almost two decades have passed since three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up on a crowded pedestrian street in central Jerusalem, killing five and wounding nearly 200 people.2 Among the dead and wounded were a number 
of American citizens.3 Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing, and because Iran 
provided terrorist training and economic assistance to Hamas, some of the victims and 
their families brought suit for compensatory and punitive damages against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and senior Iranian officials.4 The defendants failed to appear or respond 
to the complaints; the Clerk of Court entered default judgments against the defendants; 
and, in 2003, in two consolidated actions, a D.C. federal court awarded $71.5 million in 
compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages.5
The plaintiffs in those cases, known collectively at the Rubin plaintiffs, tried to enforce 
the judgment first by attaching the U.S. bank accounts of the Consulate General of Iran,6 
but because of a previous lien, the Rubin plaintiffs received nothing.7 Next, they attached 
and sold U.S. property owned by the then-Crown Prince of Iran, yielding just $390,000.8 
With a mere 1/500th of the original judgment satisfied, the Rubin plaintiffs tried a new 
approach: attaching and executing Persian antiquities held in museum collections across 
the United States. Targeting the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago and the 
Field Museum of Natural History in Illinois9 and Harvard University, several Harvard 
University art museums, and the Museum of Fine Arts in Massachusetts,10 the plaintiffs 
hoped to auction off the antiquities, covering their judgment award with the proceeds.
In Illinois, the Rubin plaintiffs sought to attach the Persepolis, the Chogha Mish,11 
and the Herzfeld Collections.12 The plaintiffs alleged that the collections were subject 
1 Gabrielle Goodwin is a Lecturer at Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. This article discusses the 
recent developments in the Rubin cases, first described in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal Threats to Cultural 
Property, (December 21, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581670.
2 Campuzano v. Islamic Republic Of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003).
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 261-62.
5 Id. at 272-77. 
6 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005 WL 670770 (D.D.C. 2005), at *1.
7 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ill. (East. Div.), Case No. 03-CV-9370, Pls.’ 
Consol. Mem. of Law (Docket #105), at 5.
8 Ill. Lit., Pls.’ Consol. Mem. of Law (Docket #105), at 5 & nn.3, 4.
9 Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2011).
10 Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F.Supp.2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006). 
11 The Persepolis and Chogha Mish Collections are antiquities recovered in the 1930s and 1960s by University of 
Chicago archaeologists and loaned to the Oriental Institute by Iran for long-term study. The collections must be returned to 
Iran when study is complete, and, in fact, parts of these collections have been returned already. Rubin, 637 F.3d at 787.
12 The Herzfeld Collection was purchased by the Field Museum from archaeologist Ernest Herzfeld, who worked in Persia 
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to attachment under two provisions in 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (“FSIA”), which provides generally 
that the U.S. property of a foreign state is 
immune to attachment unless a statutory 
exception applies,13 and one provision of 
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(“TRIA”), which permits the attachment 
of certain “blocked assets of [a] terrorist 
party.”14 The Oriental Institute and the Field 
Museum responded that no exceptions to 
immunity apply and that the antiquities 
are not blocked assets.15 For their part, 
the plaintiffs argued that immunity under 
§1609 of FSIA is personal to the foreign 
state and must be affirmatively pleaded, 
and the court agreed.16 However, two 
days before the museums were to file a 
motion to certify the order for appeal, Iran 
appeared in the district court and asserted 
§1609 attachment immunity.17 
Iran’s appearance and §1609 immunity 
pleading shifted the course of the 
proceedings. Iran argued it was entitled to 
summary judgment because the plaintiffs 
could not execute or attach the Persian 
artifacts as a matter of law.18 The Rubin 
plaintiffs then moved for further discovery 
of all Iranian assets in the United States 
to support their argument that immunity 
does not apply.19 Declining to rule on 
Iran’s motion for summary judgment, the 
magistrate judge granted the plaintiffs’ 
motion to continue discovery.20 Iran 
appealed, but the district court overruled 
Iran’s objection.21 
In 2011, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, 
Iran objected to the general-asset discovery 
ordered by the magistrate judge and to 
the district court’s earlier order declaring 
that §1609 immunity is not presumptively 
in the early twentieth century. Iran has never claimed 
ownership of the collection. Id. 
13 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 
§§1602-1611.
14 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub.L. 
No. 107-297, §201(a). 
15 Rubin, 637 F.3d at 787.
16 Id. at 787-88. 
17 Id. at 788.
18 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 WL 1169701 
(N.D. Ill 2007), at *2.
19 Id.
20 Id. at *14.
21 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 WL 2219105 
(N.D. Ill 2007), at *6.
recognized but must be asserted by the 
foreign state itself.22 Declaring both orders 
to be incompatible with the FSIA and in 
conflict with relevant precedent, the court 
reversed the district court’s orders and 
remanded for further proceedings.23 In 
2012, the Rubin plaintiffs’ writ of certiorari 
to the Supreme Court of the United States 
appealing the circuit court’s decision was 
denied.24 
While such an outcome might seem to be 
the end of a very long road for the Rubin 
plaintiffs, in fact, three substantive issues 
are now being considered by the federal 
courts in Illinois. In early 2014, further 
to the plaintiffs’ attempts to attach and 
execute on a number of artifacts held by 
the Oriental Institute of the University of 
Chicago and the Field Museum of Natural 
History, the museums and Iran moved for 
summary judgment, arguing there is no 
legal basis for attachment.25 The district 
court agreed and held that (1) a U.S. 
museum is not an agent of Iran for purposes 
of the commercial activity exception to the 
FSIA26; (2) subsection 1610(g) of the FSIA 
may allow creditors to satisfy a judgment 
by attaching assets, but only if those assets 
have lost immunity under other provisions 
in the statute; and (3) attachment was 
not permitted pursuant to TRIA because 
the artifacts were not “blocked assets.”27 
Thus, the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment was granted.28 
As of this writing in early 2015, the 
plaintiffs have appealed, and the parties 
have filed their briefs in the United 
State Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and are awaiting a date for oral 
arguments. The Rubin plaintiffs’ (A/K/A 
Judgment creditors-appellants) argument 
centers largely on the canons of statutory 
interpretation and a plain reading of the 
text.29 “In its use of the passive voice in 
22 Rubin, 637 F.3d at 784.
23 Id. at 794, 801.
24 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 133 S.Ct. 23 (2012).
25 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F.Supp.3d 1003, 
1007 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
26 Id. at 1008-11.
27 Id.at 1013-14.
28 Id. at 1015-16.
29 The text at issue is Section 1610(a) of the FSIA: “The 
property in the United States of a foreign state … used 
for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not 
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
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Section 1610(a) Congress instructed that 
anyone’s use will suffice,” and, further, the 
“Supreme Court has found that Congress 
employs a passive voice to indicate 
that a statute [sic] to be read broadly.”30 
Specifically, the plaintiffs assert, the 
statute does not require that a foreign 
state’s property be used in commercial 
activity only by the foreign state defendant 
to qualify as an exception to immunity 
from attachment.
The text of §1610(g) is also at issue.31 
The plaintiffs argue that because the 
phrase “as provided in this section” comes 
at the end of the opening paragraph 
of subsection (g), the phrase does not 
modify property (i.e., that the kinds of 
property subject to attachment are limited 
to those identified in subsections (a) and 
(b)), “but rather refers to non-substantive 
rules related to attachment and execution 
(i.e., that attachment must be conducted 
in accordance with those rules).”32 In 
their final argument, the Rubin plaintiffs 
assert that the First Circuit’s 2013 ruling, 
in a parallel case, that the antiquities 
in question were not “blocked assets,” 
subject to attachment under TRIA, is not 
dispositive.33
In Massachusetts, the Rubin plaintiffs 
followed a parallel line of litigation, similar 
to that in Illinois, attempting to attach 
antiquities to satisfy the original default 
judgment against Iran. In 2005, the 
plaintiffs moved for orders of attachment 
by trustee process against all “antiquities34 
… that are the property of the Islamic 
execution upon a judgment entered by a court of the 
United States…” Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors-
Appellants at 1, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 
03-cv-9370 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 2014).
30 Id. at 9-10. 
31 Section 1610(g) provides in part: “…[T]he property of 
a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under 
section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instru-
mentality of such a state, including property that is a sepa-
rate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly 
in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid 
of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provid-
ed in this section,…” 28 U.S.C. §1610(g)(1) (2012).
32 Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors-Appellants at 28.
33 Id. at 31.
34 These antiquities include about 500 objects held by 
Harvard and its museums and about 1,485 objects held by 
the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. The objects originated in 
or near the current borders of Iran and include “stone re-
liefs, sculptures, and archaeological specimens.” Id. at 51.
Republic of Iran in the possession of the 
Museums.35 The Museums moved to 
quash the trustee process summonses and 
dissolve the attachments, arguing that the 
antiquities were immune under the FSIA, 
and the plaintiffs responded with much 
the same argument used in the Illinois 
litigation.36 The district court decided 
the FSIA’s “commercial use” exception 
did not apply, but concluded that the 
antiquities might be attached under TRIA 
if the plaintiffs could prove the antiquities 
belonged to Iran.37 The First Circuit denied 
the parties’ petitions for leave to appeal 
until the question of ownership could be 
ascertained. The Museums again moved 
to dissolve the attachments, and this time, 
the district court found that because the 
plaintiffs had not met their burden of 
proving that any of the objects in dispute 
belonged to Iran, the motion was granted.38 
On February 27, 2013, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, 
denying the Rubin plaintiffs’ motion for 
order of attachment by trustee process 
and granting the Museums’39 motions to 
dissolve the attachments.40 However, the 
circuit court disagreed with the district 
court’s ruling that the antiquities qualify 
as “blocked assets” under TRIA.41 To 
be considered a blocked asset, the asset 
first must be “contested,” where Iran has 
claimed an interest or partial interest in 
the asset. In this case, unlike the Illinois 
case, Iran has never made a claim to any of 
the antiquities at issue, and, therefore, they 
cannot be considered contested and do not 
qualify as blocked assets.”42 
35 Id.
36 The plaintiffs made three arguments: (1) The Museums 
did not have standing to assert sovereign immunity on 
behalf of Iran; (2) even if they did, the “commercial use” 
exception to immunity under the FSIA would apply; and (3) 
in any event, the plaintiffs could reach the antiquities under 
TRIA. Id. 
37 Rubin, 456 F.Supp.2d at 236.
38 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 51-52.
39 “The Museums” here refers to Harvard University and 
its museums as well as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. 
40 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 50 (1st 
Cir. 2013).
41 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F.Supp.2d 416 
(D. Mass. 2008)
42 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 56-58. 
Two years later, it is unclear if the 
Massachusetts Rubin case will proceed in 
any form, and just how persuasive, if at 
all, the Illinois courts will find it. These 
cases present complicated legal issues for 
the courts to consider, within an extremely 
difficult context. While most people are 
sympathetic to the plight of the victims 
and their efforts at reaching the judgment 
they were awarded, attaching and selling 
off antiquities to the highest bidder is 
not likely to garner these victims much 
support. Perhaps, the Rubin plaintiffs 
will find other means to satisfy the initial 
judgment. In November 2013, a federal 
court in the Southern District of California 
issued an order granting lien claimants’ 
motion to attach a judgment.43 The lien 
claimants are the Rubin plaintiffs, and they 
were awarded title to over $9 million as a 
result of a dispute between Iran and Cubic 
Defense Systems, a contractor working 
with Iran.44 However, despite title in the 
funds vesting immediately, the plaintiffs 
will not receive any disbursement until 
the completion of the appeal.45 Satisfaction 
for the Rubin plaintiffs still appears to be a 
long time coming. u
43 Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d 
1070 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
44 Id. at 1073.
45 Id. at 1074.
